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Abstract
This paper examines the role of endogenous capital accumulation in the interac-
tion between trade and the environment in a two-country, two-sector model. Atomic
households follow a simple rule of saving: higher the real interest rate, higher the
saving rate is. In autarky, the real interest rate depends only on the quality of the
environment, and investment provides a channel allowing for the trade-off between the
amount of factor of production and the quality of the environment. In free trade, the
real interest rate depends on i) terms of trade if the environmentally sensitive sector
(agriculture) is shut down, or ii) both terms of trade and the quality of the environ-
ment if agriculture is still active. In either case, the real interest rate jumps right after
trade liberalization due to terms of trade improvement, which boosts investment and
causes capital accumulation. This scale effect dominates in the long run, causing en-
vironmental degradation even if the economy specializes in the relatively clean sector.
Trade improves the total world consumption and the country preserving agriculture
has relatively better environment in the long run.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between trade and the environment is a central topic in international eco-
nomics and environmental economics. Does trade liberalization harm the environment?
Empirical analyses provide no definitive answer. For instance, Lucas et al. (1992) suggest
that free trade is bad for the environment, while Antweiler et al. (2001) and Frankel and
Rose (2005) find no significant link between trade liberalization and environmental degrada-
tion. This is perhaps not surprising, because there are so many factors, including industrial
structure, factor endowment, abatement technology and policy stringency, that can affect
the environment, and trade is one source, but not the only, that can induce changes in
these factors. There is little reason to expect a simple relationship between trade and the
environment.
Theoretical analyses that attempt to understand the link between trade and the envi-
ronment are conducted in a wide range of contexts. Grossman and Krueger (1993) suggests
three channels—scale, composition and technique effects—by which trade can affect the en-
vironment. This criterion helps to characterize these analyses according to what channels
(among the three) are formulated and how (interacting with trade or not).1 Much of earlier
work consider only composition effect since it is the direct consequence of trade. For in-
stance, Markusen (1975) focuses on policy instruments that can alter composition effect and
discusses how the optimal policy responds to trade. Later work incorporates also technique
effect or both scale and technique effects. For instance, Copeland and Taylor (1994) and
Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) introduces the interaction between technique effect and trade
(through endogenously determined policies) by allowing for choice of abatement efforts.
However, as Copeland and Taylor (2004) pointed out in their insightful review, most of
the literature examines scale effect (if any) separately by conducting comparative statics.
This absence of endogenous economic development stands out as a notable limitation in this
literature. As Ayres and Kneese (1969) emphasized a half century ago, the significance of
waste “tends to increase as economic development proceeds, and the ability of the ambient
environment to receive and assimilate them is an important natural resource of increasing
value.” This limitation remains still in the current literature on trade and the environment,
and there is little work available exploring the interaction between scale effect and trade
through endogenous channels.
This paper develops a growth model to consider trade and the environment while for-
mulating endogenous capital accumulation. This simple model for considering these issues
1Of course there are many other criteria, such as who takes the damage of environmental degradation
(consumer or producer), the type of the model (static or dynamic), which aspect of the environment to focus
(resource or pollution), and the characteristics of pollution (transboundary or local).
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is a two-country model in which each country is similar to the small country considered in
Li (2015). The model is based on Copeland and Taylor (1999) and extends theirs in two
directions. First, households make intertemporally optimized investment decisions by decid-
ing how much to invest at every point in time to maximize the discounted lifetime utility.
Second, instead of being purely clean in Copeland and Taylor (1999), the environmentally
sensitive sector—agriculture—can be polluting with the intensity measured by a parameter.
This is motivated by the evidence that industries like agriculture are also pollution inten-
sive.2 Our analysis focuses on three fundamental effects of trade: specialization patterns,
welfare effects, and environmental impacts.
The analysis of the model yields several interesting results. First, without investment,
the qualities of the environment in closed countries depend on their own private capital and
environmental endowments. With investment, however, this paper predicts that the quali-
ties of the environment tend to converge (across closed countries). Although the convergence
requires quite strict restrictions (identical technology, time preference rate, and depreciation
rate across countries), it provides an insight about how investment and the environment
interact with each other. On one hand, the interest rate in a closed country is positively re-
lated to its environmental quality. In the country with a better environment, households face
higher interest rate and thus invest more. On the other hand, capital accumulation through
investment raises pollution (ceteris paribus) and consequently harms the environment. This
lowers the interest rate and discourages investment.
Second, moving from autarky to trade, without investment, whether free trade brings
about dramatic changes in industrial structure depends on whether agriculture is clean.3 In
contrast, this papers shows that with investment, free trade gives rise to a strong tendency to
specialization regardless of the type of agriculture. Third, as shown in Copeland and Taylor
(1999), free trade enhances (harms) the environment in the country that specializes in the
clean (dirty) sector, while in this paper, free trade increases the interest rate and encourages
further investment. This scale effect dominates in the long run and harms the environment,
even if the country specializes in the clean sector.
Moreover, in this two-country model, there may exist a set of steady-state equilibria.
Among those, the complete specialization steady-state equilibrium yields the highest world
total consumption. It is also shown that the country that preserves agriculture has its
2IPCC (2007) estimates that in 2004, agriculture contributes 14% of total GHG emissions, following 19%
from industrial processes.
3This is because the type of agriculture determines the curvature of the steady-state production possibility
frontier (PPF). If agriculture is clean, as shown in Copeland and Taylor (1999), the steady-state PPF is
convex to the origin, implying a strong tendency to specialization under free trade. If agriculture is dirty, as
shown later in this paper, the PPF is concave and thus the industrial structure will not change much if the
world price is close to the autarky price.
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environment less harmed. This is consistent with a recent view towards protectionism in
terms of environmental roles of agriculture.
The introduction of dynamic optimization complicates the model, and the characteri-
zation of specialization patterns is challenging since specialization patterns depend on en-
vironmental capital stock, which is an endogenous variable related to another endogenous
variable, private capital stock, and the world relative price of two intermediate goods is
an endogenous variable in the two-country model. To cope with these complications, we
list all possible specialization patterns, derive the constraints for each pattern, and then,
using these constraints, divide the private-environmental capital space into regimes, each
corresponding with a specialization pattern. In this way, the dynamics of private capital
stock and environmental capital stock within a regime can be described by the same set of
dynamic equations. This makes it possible to analyze the properties of steady states regime
by regime. Finally, we combine the results from all regimes to construct a whole picture of
the two-county world.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section
3 considers the autarky case. Section 4 investigates the effects of free trade between two
countries. Section 5 presents conclusions.
2 The model
The model setup closely follows those in Copeland and Taylor (1999), except that we in-
troduce investment behavior and allow agriculture to be polluting. There are two factors
of production (private capital and environmental capital), two tradable intermediate goods
(manufacturing and agriculture), and a single nontradable final good.4 Manufacturing needs
only private capital, while agriculture needs both factors. The final good is produced from
two intermediate goods, and can be either consumed or invested.5 The households choose
between consumption and investment to maximize their discounted lifetime utility.
Factors of production Private capital (K) is inelastically supplied, domestically freely,
and instantaneously mobile. Thus, private capital must be fully employed and its rentals
are equalized across active intermediate industries. The stock of private capital changes
according to
K˙ = I − δK, (1)
4Here the factor of production is defined in a broader sense as all factors that are crucial to the production.
This definition, which can be found in environmental and resource economics, emphasizes the importance of
environmental resources.
5That is, investment good and consumption good are produced with the same technology.
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where I is the investment, and δ the depreciation rate.
The services of environmental capital (V ) are freely used.6 The stock of environmental
capital is given at every point in time, and may evolve over time depending on the flow
of pollution (Z), the current level of environmental capital (V ), and the “natural” level of
environmental capital (V¯ ): V˙ = E
(
Z, V, V¯
)
. Following Copeland and Taylor (1999), assume
that
V˙ = g
(
V¯ − V
)
− Z, (2)
where g is the recovery rate of the environment. In steady state (V˙ = 0), V and Z satisfy
V = V¯ − Z/g.
Intermediate good firms Manufacturing good (M) and agriculture good (A) are both
tradable and under perfect competition. The representative firm in manufacturing employs
only private capital and emits pollutants as a joint product. The units are normalized so that
one unit of private capital produces one unit of manufacturing good and generates λm > 0
units of pollution:
M = Km, (3)
Zm = λmKm, (4)
where M is the output of manufacturing good, and Zm the flow of pollution from manufac-
turing. The representative firm in agriculture uses both private capital and environmental
capital:
A = G (V )Ka, 0 < ε ≤ 1, (5)
where G (V ) is the flow of services from an environmental capital stock of V . Therefore,
agriculture is environmentally sensitive in the sense that its productivity is affected by the
stock of environmental capital. Following Copeland and Taylor (1999), let G (V ) take the
simple form
G (V ) = V ε, 0 < ε ≤ 1,
where ε can be thought of as the sensitivity of agriculture to the quality of environment. In
contrast to Copeland and Taylor (1999), in which agriculture emits no pollutant, this model
allows for agriculture that generates pollutants at the intensity of λa > 0:
Za = λaKa. (6)
6The implicit assumption is that there is no regulation, which may be because the management of the
environment is too difficult or costly.
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We say that agriculture is clean if λa < λm, and dirty if λa > λm.
MRT, short-run PPF, and steady-state PPF Manufacturing firms maximize profits
under perfect competition. If manufacturing is operating, the interest rate (rental of private
capital, r) and the price of manufacturing good (pm) must satisfy
pm = r. (7)
Agriculture firms maximizes profits, treating the environmental capital stock as given. There-
fore, if agriculture is operating, perfect competition requires
paV
ε = r. (8)
Let MRT denote the (private) marginal rate of transformation of agriculture good for man-
ufacturing good, then7
MRT = V ε. (9)
Clearly, a necessary condition for both intermediate industries to be active is
P = MRT = V ε, (10)
where P denotes the relative price of intermediate goods, i.e., P ≡ pm/pa.
Full employment of private capital requires, using (3) and (5), that
K = Km +Ka =M +
A
V ε
. (11)
In the short run, the environmental capital stock does not change, nor does the productivity
of agriculture. Hence, (11) is the expression for the short-run production possibility frontier
(PPF), where M and A are linearly correlated, reflecting the short-run Ricardian structure
of the model.
In the long run, however, production schedules along (11) are not necessarily sustainable,
since the environmental capital stock may change over time. To obtain the (long-run) steady-
state PPF, it is useful to express the flow of pollution in terms of the output of manufacturing
good. For this purpose, substitute (3) into (4) for Km and (5) into (6) for Ka, and obtain
7Each firm takes no account of the influence of its own behavior on others. This is one of the two sources
in this model from which externalities arise. The term “private” is used to distinguish the MRT realized by
private firms from the social MRT.
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Z = λmM + λaA/V
ε. Substituting (11) for A/V ε yields
Z = λaK + (λm − λa)M. (12)
Using (12) and the relation in steady state V = V¯ − Z/g, we have
V = V¯ −
1
g
(λaK + (λm − λa)M) . (13)
To ensure specialization in either M or A will not destruct the environment, we need V¯ >
max {λmK/g, λaK/g}. Using (13) to eliminate V in (11), we can obtain the expression for
the steady-state PPF
A = (K −M)
[
V¯ −
1
g
(λaK + (λm − λa)M)
]ε
. (14)
It can be shown that
Lemma 1. Given that the stock of private capital K is fixed, then the steady-state PPF (14)
is concave/convex if agriculture is dirty (λa > λm)/clean (λa < λm).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The curvature of the steady-state PPF is crucial in determining whether the openness
of trade brings about dramatic changes in domestic industrial structure. If the steady-state
PPF is convex as in Copeland and Taylor (1999), the country tends to completely specialize
in one sector, even if the world price is very close to the autarky price.
Final good firms The final good (Q) is nontradable and is produced from two interme-
diate goods under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. For simplicity, assume
the Cobb-Douglas technology:
Q = Dbmm D
ba
a , (15)
where bm + ba = 1, and Dm and Da are the inputs of manufacturing good and agriculture
good, respectively.
Final good firms maximize profits, treating the prices of intermediate goods as given.
The zero profit condition gives the price (also the cost) of final good (p) in terms of the
prices of two intermediate goods:
p =
pbmm p
ba
a
b
, b ≡ bbmm b
ba
a . (16)
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Also, given pm and pa, Dm and Da satisfy
bm
ba
=
pmDm
paDa
. (17)
Households Households own private capital and receive interest revenue (rK). They
choose between consumption (C) and investment (I) to maximize the discounted lifetime
utility subject to the budget constraint rK = pQ. Formally, the representative household
faces the following problem, using Q = C + I = C + K˙ + δK,
max
∫
∞
0
lnCe−ρtdt, s.t. rK = p
(
C + K˙ + δK
)
. (18)
Atomistic households treat the real interest r/p as given.8 The first order condition gives
the Euler equation C˙/C = r/p− δ − ρ, ∀t [0,∞), where r/p can be seen as the real interest
rate. The transversality condition requires lims→∞
∫ s
0
γKe−ρtdt = 0, with γ the Lagrange
multiplier in the Hamiltonian H = lnC + γ (rK/p− C − δK).
The logarithmic instantaneous utility yields a simple form of the consumption function
on the optimal saddle path:
C = ρK, ∀t [0,∞) . (19)
Therefore, as long as households are optimally saving and investing, we can use the level
of K to measure the instantaneous welfare level. Substituting (19) into the Euler equation
yields
K˙
K
=
C˙
C
=
r
p
− δ − ρ, ∀t [0,∞) . (20)
Thus, we have K and V ruled by (20) and (2) together. Note that ρ, δ, g, and V¯ are
exogenous parameters, while r/p and Z are endogenous variables. The two equations do not
close the dynamics until r/p and Z are expressed in terms of K and V . This is one of our
main tasks in the following sections.
8That is, for households, the marginal revenue of investment is r/p. This is another (possible) source of
externalities in this model. To see this, note that as long as agriculture good is produced, r/p depends on
environmental capital stock, which is, in the long run, determined by private capital stock and industrial
structure. Therefore, instead of r/p, the marginal revenue of investment should be
d
dK
(
r
p
K
)
=
r
p
+K
d
K
(
r
p
)
.
8
3 Autarky
This section analyzes the equilibrium, especially the steady-state equilibrium, in the case of
autarky. In autarky equilibrium, the demand for intermediate goods is fulfilled by domestic
firms. The market clearing condition for intermediate goods is
Dm =M, Da = A.
It follows from (15) that both intermediate industries must be active and thus (10) holds.
This implies that, using (3), (5), (17), the full employment condition K = Km + Ka, and
again the market clearing condition, that
Km = bmK, Ka = baK. (21)
Therefore, in autarky equilibrium, the outputs of goods are
M = bmK, A = baV
εK, Q = bV εbaK,
the flow of pollution is
Z = Zm + Za = λK, λ ≡ bmλm + baλa, (22)
and the real interest rate satisfies, using (7), (8) and (16),
r
p
= bV εba . (23)
The dynamic equations (20) and (2) become, using (23) and (22),
K˙
K
= bV εba − δ − ρ, (24)
V˙ = g
(
V¯ − V
)
− λK, (25)
where b and λ are defined in (16) and (22) respectively. The dynamics of K and V are now
completely described by (24) and (25).
Figure 1 depicts the phase diagram, where the negatively sloped V˙ = 0 line represents
the combination of (K,V ) so that the environmental capital stock V will not change, while
along the horizontal K˙ = 0 line, the private capital stock K will not change. The unique
intersection point (K0, V0) is then the steady state. It can be shown that
9
Figure 1: Dynamics of K and V in autarky
Proposition 2. In autarky, there exists a unique, locally stable steady-state equilibrium
(K0, V0) that satisfies
K0 =
g
λ
(
V¯ − V0
)
, V0 =
(
δ + ρ
b
) 1
εba
. (26)
Proof. See Appendix A.2
The autarky steady-state stock of environmental capital V0 is positively related to depre-
ciation rate δ and time preference rate ρ. Therefore, if households are less patient (larger ρ),
the country is more protective of the environment. The intuition is straightforward. House-
holds with less patience tend to invest less, and thus the country ends up with a lower level
of private capital stock in steady state. This leads to less pollution and eventually a better
environment. Although the result may be reversed if we drop the assumption that house-
holds do not really care about the environment, the implication remains here: investment
introduces a channel to enjoy higher income by sacrificing the environment, and households
with more patience tend to exploit this opportunity more.
On the other hand, V0 is negatively related to b, which can be seen as an index that
measures the difference between the shares of two intermediate goods in the final good.9
The relationship between V0 and ε depends on whether (δ + ρ) /b is greater or less than one.
Since the possible minimum value of b is 1/2 when bm = ba = 1/2, (δ + ρ) /b < 1 as long as
δ + ρ is less than 1/2. Taking (δ + ρ) /b < 1 as granted, V0 is positively related to ε. This is
9It is easy to check that b is an increasing function of |bm − ba|.
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intuitive because it says that if agriculture in a country is more sensitive to the environment
than other countries, then the environment in this country should be better.
It is clear from (26) that V0 has nothing to do with V¯ (the natural level of environ-
mental capital), nor λi (i = m, a) (the emission intensities). This implies a convergence
of steady-state environmental capital stocks across countries that have the same produc-
tion technologies, depreciation rate, and time preference rate, regardless of the differences
in environmental endowments. The intuition comes by realizing that, in the presence of
investment, households in a country with higher V¯ will exploit this advantage by investing
more. In steady state, the advantage in environmental endowment is exploited to the point
so that all countries have the same level of environmental capital stock. As a result, the
country more abundant in environmental endowment will have higher private capital stock
and consumption in steady state, which can be seen from the expression of K0. Let P0 and
(r/p)
0
denote, respectively, the relative price of intermediate goods and the real rental in
autarky steady state, then we have P0 = V
ε
0
and(r/p)
0
= bV εba
0
.
It is also worth noting that the local stability is quite robust. Suppose the more general
evolution function V˙ = E
(
V¯ , V, Z
)
instead of (2), and G (V ) instead of V ε in (5). The local
asymptotic stability holds as long as ∂E/∂Z < 0, ∂E/∂V < 0 and dG/dV > 0 around the
steady state. The global stability, however, is not necessarily true. The possibility cannot
be excluded of the existence of a limit cycle where the pair (K,V ) repeats the same pattern
of evolution. The discussion on global stability and limit cycle is an interesting issue, but
beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Trade equilibrium
This section considers a world in which there are two countries, Home and Foreign, with the
asterisk superscript denoting Foreign-related variables. To neutralize other factors for trade,
we focus on the symmetric case in which two countries share the same V¯ , bm, ρ, and δ.
10 Let
the world relative price of intermediate goods Pw ≡ pwm/pwa, where pwm and pwa denote,
respectively, the world price of manufacturing good and that of agriculture good. In this
two-country world, Pw is an endogenous variable, and thus specialization patterns depend
on both the production side and the demand side, including incomes (rK and r∗K∗), levels
of environmental capital (V and V ∗), and the expenditure shares on intermediate goods (ba
and bm). To tackle this problem, as a first step we examine how many possible specialization
10Environmental capital stocks in both countries are endogenously determined and not necessarily iden-
tical. It is possible for two countries to have different levels of environmental capital stock in equilibrium
(thus obtaining comparative advantages) and trade with each other. Showing this possibility is actually the
focus in what follows.
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patterns there are and what range of K and V each pattern corresponds with.
4.1 Specialization patterns and regimes
Note that the relative magnitude of environmental capital stocks determines the compar-
ative advantage. If V > V ∗, then Home has a comparative advantage in agriculture and
must produce it, while Foreign must produce manufacturing good. Clearly, there are three
possible specialization patterns, which I denote Pattern (D,M∗), (A,M∗), and (A,D∗). In
Pattern (D,M∗), Home produces both while Foreign completely specializes in manufactur-
ing. In Pattern (A,M∗), Home completely specializes in agriculture while Foreign completely
specializes in manufacturing. In Pattern (A,D∗), Home completely specializes in agriculture
while Foreign produces both.
If V < V ∗, there are also three possible specialization patterns. Since the two countries
are symmetric, these patterns can be obtained by swapping “Home” and “Foreign” in the
situation of V > V ∗. Let (M∗, D), (M∗, A), and (D∗, A) refer to these symmetric special-
ization patterns. Finally, if V = V ∗, Home and Foreign have the same MRT, and by (A1),
there is no trade between two countries.
It is also useful to partition the factor space (K, K∗, V , V ∗) into regimes, each of which
corresponds with a specialization pattern. Let each regime be named in the same way. Table
1 summarizes all possible specialization patterns and the corresponding regimes.
Range of V Specialization pattern
Regime (D,M∗)
V > V ∗
Home produces both, Foreign produces only M
Regime (A,M∗) Home produces only A, Foreign produces only M
Regime (A,D∗) Home produces only A, Foreign produces both
Boundary V = V ∗ as in autarky
Regime (M∗, D)
V > V ∗
Home produces only M, Foreign produces both
Regime (M∗, A) Home produces only M, Foreign produces only A
Regime (D∗, A) Home produces both, Foreign produces only A
Table 1: Possible specialization patterns
Note that Table 1 does not provide a complete characterization of regimes, because in
the two-country case, the range of a regime is not only related to V , but also related to K.
The rest of this section accomplishes three main tasks. The first is to calculate the range of
K that corresponds with each pattern.
After characterizing regimes, I investigate the existence of steady-state equilibria, their
stability, and the effects of trade on welfare and the environment in each regime. Again, the
analysis focuses on the situations V > V ∗ and V = V ∗, since the results of V < V ∗ can be
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obtained simply by switching “Home” and “Foreign” in the results of V > V ∗. The third
task is to combine the results of all regimes to construct a whole picture of the two-country
world.
4.2 Regime (D,M ∗)
To characterize this regime, assume that the two-country world is experiencing Pattern
(D,M∗) to derive the range of private capital stocks (K and K∗) that characterize Regime
(D,M∗), the world relative price (Pw), the real interest rates (r/p and r
∗/p∗), and the flows
of pollution (Z and Z∗).
Since Home produces both intermediate goods in Pattern (D,M∗), the world relative
price is determined by the environmental capital stock in Home: Pw = V
ε. Since both
countries produce manufacturing good, the interest rates are equalized across countries:
r = r∗ = pwm. It follows from (16) that the real interest rates are also equalized across
countries:
r
p
=
r∗
p∗
= pwm
(
pbmwmp
ba
wa
b
)−1
= bP baw = bV
εba . (27)
The Cobb-Douglas type of final good production function implies that the world demand for
manufacturing good Dwm satisfies
Dwm =
bm (rK + r
∗K∗)
pwm
= bm (K +K
∗) . (28)
Foreign supplies M∗ = K∗ units of manufacturing good, thus the world market clearing
condition requires
M = Dwm −K
∗ = bmK − baK
∗. (29)
Since M > 0 in Pattern (D,M∗), (29) imposes a constraint on the relative magnitude of
private capital stocks:
K
K∗
>
ba
bm
. (30)
Therefore, Regime (D,M∗) is characterized by both V > V ∗ and (30). If (30) fails to hold,
there is no positive solution for M , which means Pattern (D,M∗) does not exist.
Given M and M∗, the flows of pollution in both countries are, using (12),
Z = λK − ba (λm − λa)K
∗, Z∗ = λmK
∗. (31)
Substituting (27) and (31) into (20) and (2), as well as its Foreign counterpart, yields the
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dynamic system in Regime (D,M∗):
K˙
K
= bV εba − δ − ρ,
V˙ = g
(
V¯ − V
)
− λK + ba (λm − λa)K
∗,
K˙∗
K∗
= bV εba − δ − ρ,
V˙ ∗ = g
(
V¯ − V ∗
)
− λmK
∗.
Simple calculation gives the steady-state environmental capital stock in Home:
VT = V0 =
(
δ + ρ
b
) 1
εba
,
and a linear relationship between the steady-state private capital stock in Home KT and in
Foreign K∗T :
KT =
ba (λm − λa)
λ
K∗T +
g
λ
(
V¯ − V0
)
=
ba (λm − λa)
λ
K∗T +K0, (32)
where K0 and V0 are the autarky steady-state stocks of private and environmental capital,
respectively. The steady-state environmental capital stock in Foreign is also linearly related
to K∗T
V ∗T = V¯ −
λm
g
K∗T . (33)
Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium vector {VT , KT , K
∗
T , V
∗
T } has one dimension of free-
dom.
Note that the condition V > V ∗ in Pattern (D,M∗) implies another constraint on the
relative magnitude of K and K∗ in steady state:11
KT
K∗T
<
λm + ba (λm − λa)
λ
. (34)
Together with (30), the condition for the existence of steady-state equilibrium in Pattern
(D,M∗) is ba/bm < [λm + ba (λm − λa)] /λ, which can be simplified into
bmλm > baλa. (35)
11Since V > V ∗, we must have VT > V
∗
T
. By substituting VT and V
∗
T
into V˙ = V˙ ∗ = 0 for V and V ∗, and
using VT > V
∗
T
, we can obtain −λK + ba (λm − λa)K
∗ > −λmK
∗ in steady state. This directly gives (34).
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(a) Dirty agriculture (λa > λm) (b) Clean agriculture (λa < λm)
Figure 2: Steady-state private capital stocks in Regime (D,M∗)
It follows directly that
Lemma 3. There exists steady-state equilibrium satisfying Pattern (D,M∗) if and only if
bmλm > baλa.
Figure 2 illustrates the linear relationship between KT and K
∗
T . In the figure, Regime
(D,M∗) is the area that lies above the ray with slope ba/bm. In Regime (D,M
∗), the
area allowing for the existence of steady-state equilibrium lies below the ray with slope
(λm + ba (λm − λa)) /λ. The line passing through D and E satisfies (32). Hence the line
segment DE (except for the two end points D and E) represents the set of the steady-state
equilibria that have specialization pattern (D,M∗).
According to (33), larger K∗T means smaller V
∗
T , thus V
∗
T declines when moving along DE
towards E. Moreover, if agriculture is dirty (see Figure 2a), the slope of DE is negative.12
This implies that if one country becomes better off (higher private capital stock and thus
consumption), the other country must be worse off. In contrast, if agriculture is clean (see
Figure 2b), DE is positively sloped. An increase in private capital stock in one country is a
win-win adjustment. The following proposition summarizes the results.
12It is easy to show that ba (λm − λa) /λ < ba/bm always holds, thus DE must intersect the two rays with
slope ba/bm and slope (λm + ba (λm − λa)) /λ, respectively. Also, according to the condition for the existence
of steady-state equilibrium (35), we can obtain that, if λa > λm then 1 > (λm + ba (λm − λa)) /λ > ba/bm,
and if λa < λm then (λm + ba (λm − λa)) /λ > ba/bm > 1.
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Proposition 4. Given that bmλm > baλa holds, a two-country world adopts these charac-
teristics.
SP (steady state): There is a set of steady-state equilibria satisfying Pattern (D,M∗).
Each steady-state equilibrium {VT , KT , K
∗
T , V
∗
T } is characterized by (32), (33), (30) and (34).
Moreover, each steady-state equilibrium is stable if and only if λ+ ba (λa − λm) > 0. But no
steady-state equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
WE (steady state): In Home, if agriculture is dirty/clean, then steady-state consumption
is necessarily lower/higher than in autarky. In Foreign, if agriculture is dirty, then steady-
state consumption is necessarily higher than in autarky.
EI (steady state): The environment in Home remains the same as in autarky, while it
deteriorates in Foreign.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
4.3 Regime (A,M ∗)
We now consider Regime (A,M∗). Similarly, we derive related results by assuming the two-
country world is experiencing Pattern (A,M∗). Since Home produces only agriculture good
and Foreign produces only manufacturing good in Pattern (A,M∗), the interest rates in both
countries are, respectively,
r = pwaV
ε, r∗ = pwm. (36)
The world supply of manufacturing good is provided only by Foreign:
M∗ = K∗.
On the other hand, the world demand is
Dwm =
bm (rK + r
∗K∗)
pwm
= bm
(
V ε
Pw
K +K∗
)
.
The world market clearing condition determines the world relative price as follows:
Pw =
bmK
baK∗
V ε. (37)
Note that in Pattern (A,M∗), we have V ∗ε ≤ Pw ≤ V
ε, which imposes a constraint on the
relative magnitude of K and K∗:
ba
bm
(
V ∗
V
)ε
≤
K
K∗
≤
ba
bm
. (38)
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Therefore, Regime (A,M∗) is characterized by both V > V ∗ and (38).
It follows from (36)and (16) that in Home
r
p
= pwaV
ε
(
pbmwmp
ba
wa
b
)−1
=
bV ε
P bmw
, (39)
which together with (37) yields the real interest rate in Home:
r
p
= ba
(
K∗
K
)bm
V εba . (40)
From (36), (16) and (37), we can also obtain the real interest rate in Foreign:
r∗
p∗
= bP baw = bm
(
K
K∗
)ba
V εba . (41)
The flows of pollution are simply determined by
Z = λaK, Z
∗ = λmK
∗. (42)
Substituting (40), (41) and (42) into (20) and (2) for r/p and Z, and doing the same for
Foreign, we can obtain the dynamic system in Regime (A,M∗):
K˙
K
= ba
(
K∗
K
)bm
V εba − δ − ρ,
V˙ = g
(
V¯ − V
)
− λaK,
K˙∗
K∗
= bm
(
K
K∗
)ba
V εba − δ − ρ,
V˙ ∗ = g
(
V¯ − V ∗
)
− λmK
∗.
In steady state, the stock of private capital must satisfy
KT
K∗T
=
ba
bm
. (43)
Substituting into the dynamic system yields the steady-state environmental capital stock in
Home:
VT = V0 =
(
δ + ρ
b
) 1
εba
,
which is the same as in Pattern (D,M∗), as well as in autarky. The steady-state private
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capital stock in Home is then
KT =
g
(
V¯ − V0
)
λa
, (44)
while in Foreign, it is
K∗T =
bmg
(
V¯ − V0
)
baλa
, V ∗T = V¯ −
bmλm
baλa
(
V¯ − V0
)
. (45)
Since Pattern (A,M∗) requires VT > V
∗
T , it leads to the same condition as in (35). Therefore,
Lemma 5. There exists steady-state equilibrium satisfying Pattern (A,M∗) if and only if
bmλm > baλa.
These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6. Given that bmλm > baλa holds, a two-country world adopts these charac-
teristics.
SP (steady state): There is a unique, locally half-stable (stable in the half space: K/K∗ ≤
ba/bm), steady-state equilibrium satisfying Pattern (A,M
∗). The steady-state equilibrium
{VT , KT , K
∗
T , V
∗
T } is described by (33), (44), and (45).
WE (steady state): In Home, if agriculture is dirty/clean, then steady-state consumption
is necessarily lower/higher than in autarky. In Foreign, if agriculture is dirty, then steady-
state consumption is necessarily higher than in autarky.
EI (steady state): The environment in Home remains the same as in autarky, while it
deteriorates in Foreign.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
4.4 Regime (A,D∗)
We now characterize Regime (A,D∗), in which the two-country world has Pattern (A,D∗).
Since Home produces only agriculture good and Foreign produces both, the world relative
price is determined by the Foreign environment: Pw = V
∗ε. The real interest rate in Home
is, using (39),
r
p
=
bV ε
P bmw
= bV ∗εba
(
V
V ∗
)ε
, (46)
and the real interest rate in Foreign is, using (27),
r∗
p∗
= bP baw = bV
∗εba . (47)
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We have two observations for Pattern (A,D∗). First, as with the constraint (30) for Pattern
(D,M∗) and (38) for Pattern (A,M∗), the constraint for Pattern (A,D∗) is
K
K∗
<
ba
bm
(
V ∗
V
)ε
, (48)
which, together with V > V ∗, characterize Regime (A,D∗). Second, we have r/p > r∗/p∗ for
V > V ∗. Hence, the growth rate of private capital stock in Home is higher than in Foreign,
implying that the ratio K/K∗ increases over time. Sooner or later, (48) will break down and
the two-country world leaves Regime (A,D∗). This argument is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. There is no steady-state equilibrium satisfying Pattern (A,D∗).
4.5 Boundary
The range of boundary is simply the subspace satisfying V = V ∗. On the boundary, there
is no trade between Home and Foreign according to assumption (A1). We can treat them
as closed countries and calculate the steady-state results. Since Home and Foreign are
symmetric, we have
KT = K
∗
T = K0. (49)
VT = V
∗
T = V0 (50)
However, these steady states is unstable, because any shock, as long as the shock does not
result in K = K∗ and V = V ∗, will generate a difference in V and V ∗ or a tendency for V
and V ∗ becoming different. This causes the two-country world to leave the boundary.
4.6 The whole picture
For the two-country world, we have analyzed the relevant steady-state properties in regimes
(D,M∗), (A,M∗), (A,D∗) and on the boundary. With these results in hand, we can see how
the steady-state equilibria in one regime are related to those in another regime.
First, we note that values of bm, λm and λa are crucial for the existence of the steady-state
equilibrium in which two countries are trading with each other. It follows from Lemma 3,
Lemma 5, and Proposition 7 that
Proposition 8. There exists steady-state trade equilibrium if and only if bmλm > baλa.
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Second, the unique steady-state equilibrium in Regime (A,M∗) can be arrived at by
letting KT/K
∗
T in Regime (D,M
∗) approach ba/bm. This can be verified by letting KT/K
∗
T =
ba/bm in (29) to obtain M = 0. Therefore, point E in Figure 2b is actually the unique
equilibrium in Regime(A,M∗).
Third, if we letKT/K
∗
T in Regime (D,M
∗) go in another direction to [λm + ba (λm − λa)] /λ,
we will arrive at the boundary. To see this, we substitute KT/K
∗
T = [λm + ba (λm − λa)] /λ
into the dynamic system in Regime (D,M∗) and let K˙ = K˙∗ = V˙ = V˙ ∗ = 0, to obtain
V ∗T = VT = V0 and KT +K
∗
T = 2K0.
Finally, in theK∗-K plane, the unique steady-state (non-trade) equilibrium on the bound-
ary is the intersection of KT + K
∗
T = 2K0 and KT = K
∗
T . The steady-state equilibria in
Regime (D,M∗) lie on the line segment with slope ba (λm − λa) /λ. It is easy to check that
ba (λm − λa) /λ > −1. Thus, the steady-state private capital stocks in Regime (D,M
∗) sat-
isfy KT +K
∗
T > 2K0, which means that the world total steady-state consumption in Pattern
(D,M∗) is higher than in autarky.
These observations are illustrated in Figure 3, with 3a depicting the dirty agriculture
case and 3b the clean agriculture case. In both figures, the line segment DE (except for the
end points D and E) contains the steady-state equilibria satisfying Pattern (D,M∗), point E
is the unique steady-state equilibrium satisfying Pattern (A,M∗), and point F is the unique
steady-state equilibrium on the boundary in which there is no trade between two countries.
The line passing through DD’ satisfies KT +K
∗
T = 2K0. Similarly, the line segment D’E’ and
point E’ correspond, respectively, to the steady-state equilibria satisfying Pattern (M∗, D)
(the symmetric counterpart of Pattern (D,M∗) satisfying V < V ∗), and the unique steady-
state equilibrium satisfying Pattern (M∗, A) (the symmetric counterpart of Regime (A,M∗)
satisfying V < V ∗). We can see very clearly from Figure 3 that the world total steady-state
consumption at point E (also E’) attains the highest level among all steady states. The
above arguments can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 9. Free trade increases the world total steady-state consumption, which attains
the highest level when both countries completely specialize.
Recalling the results associated with patterns (D,M∗) and (A,M∗), we notice that the
two patterns share the same feature that Foreign completely specializes in manufacturing
good. Also, the steady-state equilibria in the corresponding regimes are stable, though not
asymptotically stable for those equilibria satisfying Pattern (D,M∗). Moreover, since there
is no steady state in Regime (A,D∗), no country will completely specialize in agriculture in
steady state. Finally, the knife-edge steady-state equilibrium on the boundary is unstable.
These points leads to the following implication.
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(a) Dirty agriculture (λa > λm) (b) Clean agriculture (λa < λm)
Figure 3: Steady-state private capital stocks in two-country world
Remark 10. In a two-country world, there is a strong tendency for one country to completely
specialize in manufacturing, while the other country may either completely specialize in
agriculture or remain diversified.
5 Conclusion
In a model without investment, which sector—clean or dirty—the country specializes in
when opened to trade produces the reverse environmental consequence of trade. In contrast,
in a world with endogenous investment, free trade always harms the environment in the
long run, even if the country specializes in the clean sector. Moreover, in a world without
investment, the environmentally sensitive sector—agriculture—being clean or dirty matters
since it determines the shape of the steady-state PPF, which in turn determines specializa-
tion patterns and amplifies other effects of trade. However, in a world where investment is
available, regardless of whether agriculture is clean or dirty, there always exists a strong ten-
dency towards specialization. The intuition here bears some resemblance with the dynamic
Heckscher-Ohlin model (see, e.g. Stiglitz, 1970; Baxter, 1992; Brecher et al., 2005). That is,
when private capital can be produced and invested, it is actually, in the long run, an inter-
mediate good rather than a primary factor. As shown in Samuelson (1951), if there is only
one primary factor and no externality, the PPF must be linear (or contain a hyperplane).
The new ingredient in our model is that the only “real” primary factor—environmental
capital—is subject to production externalities.
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Although this paper develops a framework allowing trade, investment, and the envi-
ronment to be discussed together, it neglects many important elements. First, the model
implicitly assumes that the production of capital good uses the same technology as con-
sumption good. The assumption is restrictive and it is interesting to see what would happen
by relaxing the assumption. Actually, if manufacturing good can be used as capital good,
and if there is no capital income tax, then households will keep investing, even in autarky,
because investment is always profitable for them. This eventually destroys the environment,
and consequently, their own welfare.
Therefore, the optimal policies that can correct the resource misallocation due to ex-
ternalities (see footnotes 7 and 8), as well as the influences on trade and the environment,
are another interesting topic. Also, the model considers only “damage on production”. It
should yield richer results by incorporating “damage on utility” into the model. In addition,
the pollution in the model is non-transboundary. It is meaningful to consider the pollution
that can cross the border. Moreover, by assuming constant pollution intensities, the model
excludes the abatement behavior, which is another significant aspect in reality. Finally, the
model considers two symmetric countries to neutralize other forces for trade. It may give rise
to some interesting results if one allows for differences in time preference rates or pollution
intensities between countries.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Differentiate A with respect to M in (14) and obtain
dA
dM
= −V ε−1 [ε (µm − µa) (K −M) + V ] ,
where µm ≡ λm/g and µa ≡ λa/g. Differentiating dA/dM again gives
d2A
dM2
= ε (µm − µa)V
ε−2 [2V − (1− ε) (µm − µa) (K −M)]
≡ ε (µm − µa)V
ε−2△. (51)
Since M ≤ K, 0 < ε ≤ 1, we have △ > 0 when µm < µa. To obtain the sign of △ when
µm > µa, rewrite △ into
△ = [ε (µm − µa) (K −M) + V ] + [V − (µm − µa) (K −M)] ,
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Using (13) gives
△ = [ε (µm − µa) (K −M) + V ] +
[
V¯ − µmK
]
.
Since V¯ > max {µmK,µaK}, we have △ > 0 when µm > µa. Hence, △ > 0 holds for both
µm < µa and µm > µa. The sign of (51) is the same as µm − µa.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The uniqueness is obvious from (24) and (25). The Jacobian around the steady-state point
is
J ≡
∂
(
K˙, V˙
)
∂ (K,V )
=
[
0 bεbaV
εba−1
−λ −g
]
.
The local stability directly follows det J = λbεbaV
εba−1 > 0 and trJ = −g < 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(SP) Since some results follow directly from the discussion prior to the proposition, we
need only prove the stability. The Jacobian around the steady-state points is
J ≡
∂
(
K˙, V˙ , K˙∗, V˙ ∗
)
∂ (K,V,K∗, V ∗)
=


0 bεbaV
εba−1 0 0
−λ −g −ba (λa − λm) 0
0 bεbaV
εba−1 0 0
0 0 −λm −g

 .
Routine calculation gives the characteristic equation
|J − σI| = σ4 + 2gσ3 +
(
B + g2
)
σ2 +Bgσ = 0,
where B ≡ bεbaV
εba−1 [λ+ ba (λa − λm)]. Factorization gives
|J − σI| = σ (σ + g)
(
σ2 + gσ +B
)
.
Note |J − σI| = 0 has solutions σ1 = 0, σ2 = −g < 0. Hence, the stability is equiv-
alent to that the remaining two solutions are negative, which means B > 0, and thus
λ+ ba (λa − λm) > 0. Because σ1 = 0, the system is not asymptotically stable.
(WE) By (32) and noting that K∗T > 0, we have KT ≶ K0 if λa ≷ λm. By the consumption
function (19), the steady-state consumption in Home CT satisfies that CT ≶ C0 if λa ≷ λm.
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Similarly, according to (33) and V ∗T < VT = V0, K
∗
T > K0 and thus C
∗
T > C0.
As for the world total steady-state consumption, CT + C
∗
T = ρ (KT +K
∗
T ). By (32),
KT +K
∗
T = λmK
∗
T/λ+K0. Substituting (33) for K
∗
T yields KT +K
∗
T = K0+ g
(
V¯ − V ∗T
)
/λ.
Given that V ∗T < VT = V0 in Pattern I, g
(
V¯ − V ∗T
)
/λ > K0 and thus KT +K
∗
T > 2K0.
(EI) The result can be directly obtained from the expression of VT and the condition
VT > V
∗
T .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
For the same reason, we need only prove the stability. The Jacobian around the steady-state
point is
J =


−babm
(
K∗
K
)bm
V εba ba
(
K∗
K
)bm
εbaV
εba−1 babm
(
K
K∗
)ba
V εba 0
−λ −g 0 0
babm
(
K∗
K
)bm
V εba bm
(
K
K∗
)ba
εbaV
εba−1 −babm
(
K
K∗
)ba
V εba 0
0 0 −λm −g

 .
Simple calculation gives
|J1| = −B < 0,
|J2| = Bg +Dλa > 0,
|J3| = −2λa
ba
bm
BD < 0,
|J | = −g |J3| > 0,
where B ≡ babm
(
K∗
K
)bm
V εba > 0, and D ≡ ba
(
K∗
K
)bm
εbaV
εba−1 > 0. Hence, J is negative
definite, which proves the asymptotical stability. Note that this holds around only one side
of the equilibrium point, namely K/K∗ ≤ ba/bm. On the other side, namely K/K
∗ > ba/bm,
the condition required for Pattern (A,M∗) fails.
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